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This Article assesses the freedom of expression in Russia and prospects
for its future: what has the Russian state promised its citizens, in what legal
forms have those promises been made, and how well are those paper
promises being kept in practice? The Article considers recent state actions
and statutes enacted to regulate speech, association, and other forms of
expression, and determines that these are possible because of the very weak
separation of powers in the Russian Federation. The Article concludes by
looking at the European Convention on Human Rights as one hope for a
power capable of exerting influence on Russian practices, although it exists
outside of Russia. Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
established under the Convention present a roadmap for future reform
according to standards that Russia has already agreed to accept.
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"The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there."
-L.P. Hartley**
Freedom of expression in post-Soviet Russia? The choice of title for
this panel's inquiry-post-Soviet Russia-is itself noteworthy. No other
country is described so often in terms of its past as is Russia. Certainly, the
other BRICS countries are not routinely given prefixes.I Russia has been
post-Soviet for more than twenty years. Our expectations seem cast rather
low if more than a generation after the collapse of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics-a generation that neither knew Soviet citizenship nor
feared Soviet rule-we remain inclined to refer to Russia not in terms of
what it has become but in terms of what it is still struggling to leave behind. 2
Compared to Soviet Russia, post-Soviet Russia is quite free. And yet,
evaluatinf freedom of expression in Russia today is not an uncomplicated
exercise. The organizers of this excellent symposium are right to draw
attention to the shadow cast by Russia's past. For although the problems we
encounter with freedom of expression in today's Russia are quite different
from those of Soviet times, Russia's post-Soviet present is a consequence of
vestiges of a Soviet past that linger still in Russian society, politics, and law.
Consider some post-Soviet facts about Russia with which to start our
inquiry:
** L.P. HARTLEY, THE Go-BETWEEN 9 (1953).
References to post-apartheid South Africa are occasionally seen in print but not in the
materials for this symposium, although the period associated with the dismantling of
apartheid, 1990-1994, broadly overlapped the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
2 This assertion is not meant to criticize the student organizers of this symposium. In fact,
the leading, peer-reviewed academic journal devoted to the study of contemporary Russian
law, politics, and society remains entitled POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS.
Whatever meaning the conveners of this symposium intended to convey by the phrase
"freedom of expression," I intend to convey a very broad meaning, inclusive of freedoms of
speech, the press, association, and thought. This definition is in keeping with Russian
constitutional law, at least in the aspirational sense. See KOHCTHTYWI POCCHfICKOrf
DEllEPAUHH [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] arts. 28, 29, 30, 31 (Russ.), translated at
http://eng.constitution.kremlin.ru; see also JANE HENDERSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 234 (2011). It is also in keeping with the obligations Russia accepted as
a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights. See Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No.
194 [hereinafter European Convention] (providing that freedom of expression "shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers").
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For the period December 2011 to November 2012, Reporters without
Borders ranked Russia 148 out of 179 countries in terms of press freedom,
far below the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kyrpyzstan, Afghanistan,
and only just beating out Singapore, Iraq, and Burma. Since 2000, at least
19 journalists have been killed and few of their killers, let alone the plotters,
have been brought to justice. 5
Freedom House reported Russia as "not free" in its 2012 freedom of the
press report.6 According to that source, the Russian state "owns, either
directly or through proxies, all six national television networks, two national
radio networks, two of the 14 national newspapers, more than sixty percent
of the roughly 45,000 refistered local newspapers and periodicals, and two
national news agencies."
Forty-nine percent of the population has access to the Internet, but
Freedom House ranks Russia as only "partly free" in 2012 in terms of
Internet freedom. This is largely due to controls on Internet access by the
Ministry of Justice and Roskomnadzor, the state's regulatory agencK for
communications. 9 Domain names may be seized without court order, and
4 REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2013 (2013), available at
http://fr.rsf.org/[MG/pdf/classement 2013_gb-bd.pdf.
Russia - Freedom in the World 2013, FREEDOM HOUSE,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/russia (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
6 Russia - Freedom of the Press 2012, FREEDOM HOUSE,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/russia (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
7 Id.
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2012, at 411 (2012), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%20201 2%20-
%20Full%20Report 0.pdf [hereinafter FREEDOM ON THE NET].
9 Id.
10 COORDINATION CENTER FOR TLD RU/PD, The Terms and Conditions of Domain Names
Registration in Domains RU and .PcI, § 5.5, (Sept. 10, 2011)
http://www.cctld.ru/en/docs/rules.php (approved by decision 2011-18/81 ot 05.10.201 and
effective Nov. 11, 2011) ("The Registrar may terminate the domain name delegation on the
basis of a decision in writing by a head (deputy head or equaled to him public official) of an
agency, which exercises operational search actions."). A further elaboration on this process is
available in the form of an "Explanation" (Pa352CHeHHsI) available in Russian only.
KOOPAHHALIHOHHbIfl LIEHTP HALHOHAJIbHOEO aIOMEHA CETH 1HTEPHET [COORDINATION
CENTER FOR TLD RU/PI)], PamsscneHmi: no nopsaxy npHmeHCHHI n. 5.5 TpaBI
perHCTpaum IomeHHbIx HMeH B gOMeHc RU m PCI [Explanations: In the Order of Application
of Item 5.5 The Terms and Conditions of Domain Names Registration in Domains .RU and
.PCI], (Russ.) http://www.cctld.ru/ru/activities/faq/5.5.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2013). The
Coordination Center is a non-commercial entity that administers the top-level Internet domain
suffixes .RU and PCI. A representative of the Russian Federation Ministry of Mass
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websites have been blocked regardless of their placement on lists required by
laws against "extremism.'1
Until relatively recently, President Vladimir Putin has used this control
of the media to his advantage and with little difficulty. Unlike his Soviet
predecessors (whose censorship and media control were both more
formalized and more extreme), President Putin's approval rating is much
higher than most major western leaders-62 percent in January 2013.12
President Putin annually holds nationally televised press conferences that
last four or five hours at a stretch.13 His stage-managed appearances are
now the stuff of legend.14 His persona is a carefully crafted creature of the
media, which, for all intents and purposes, has become his media.
Communication sits on its 13-member governing council. The two agreements between the
Ministry and the Center, posted on the Coordination Center website, indicate in identical
language that the Ministry, "as the federal organ of executive power that carries out the
functions for the formulation and implementation of State policy and normative-legal
regulation in the sphere of information technologies delegates a representative to the
management (Council) of the Coordination Center." CornamteHHe o B3aHMoA~eiCTBHH
Mexay MI4HHCTepcTBoM CB13 ii MaccoBnix KoM?4yHHKaHii PocCIHcKofi GetepaunH H
KoopHHaaHOHHblM UeHTpom HaItHOHalIbHOrO AoMeHa CeTH HHTepHeT no Bonpocam
YnpaBJieHHi HaUHOHaJIbHbIM )IoMeHOM <<.RU>> [Agreement About Cooperation Between the
Russian Federation Ministry of Information and Mass Communication and the Coordination
Center for TLD on the Subject of the Management of the National Domain .RU], art. 2, Feb.
18, 2009, available at http://www.cctld.ru/files/minsvyaz/aggr ru.pdf; CornatueHHe o
B3aHmojteiicTBan Meavty MHHHCTepCTBOM CBs3H H MaccOBblx KoMMyHHKaQHIi PoccHiicKofl
Degepauni H KoopAHHauHOHHhlM UCHTpom HaUnoHallhHoro goMeHa CCTH HHTepHeT no
Bonpocam YnpaBneHHa HaUHoHaOJbHblM goMeHoM <<.PD>> [Agreement About Cooperation
Between the Russian Federation Ministry of Information and Mass Communication and the
Coordination Center for TLD on the Subject of the Management of the National Domain
.PD], art. 2, Apr. 7, 2010, available at http://www.cctld.ru/files/minsvyaz/aggrrf.pdf.
" FREEDOM ON THE NET, supra note 8.
12 Alissa de Carbonnel, Russian Pollster Says Approval For Putin at 12-Year Low,
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/24/us-russia-putin-
approval-idUSBRE90NOIX20130124. This rating is the lowest since Putin first assumed the
presidency of Russia 13 years ago.
13 Putin Sets New Q&A Session Record, RIA NovosTI (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130425/180844955.html (reporting 2013 televised session lasting four
hours, 47 minutes).
14 See Alan Taylor, Vladimir Putin, Action Man, ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2011/09/vladimir-putin-action-man/l00147/ (showing
photographs of Putin's most well-known exploits, including those in which the president has
"piloted firefighting planes, darted whales, driven race cars, and taken a submersible 1,400
meters (4,600 ft) below the surface of Lake Baikal"); see also Andrew Osborn, Vladimir
Putin Diving Discovery Was Staged, Spokesman Admits, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 5, 2011),
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The monopolization of media outlets and outsized press conferences
(which most specialists on Russian politics doubt are instances of truly
spontaneous, unmediated interaction with the Russian public ) brings to
mind a scene from Shakespeare's Henry V. Henry, having just won the
battle of Agincourt, seeks the hand of Katharine of France. Katharine is
shocked at the proposal. "Is it possible dat I sould love de ennemi of
France?" she asks. No, says Henry, it is not possible that you should love an
enemy, "[b]ut, in loving me, you should love the friend of France; for I love
France so well that I will not part with a village of it; I will have it all mine
,,16
One can see a parallel with President Putin's approach to freedom of
expression. He loves freedom of expression so well that he would not part
with a single bit of it. Is that more or less what we should expect from a
post-Soviet ruler, even twenty years after Soviet rule?
What you expect freedom of expression in Russia should look like today
depends on the terms by which you judge Russia in general. If you consider
Russia in isolation, in terms of its own history, then today's state of affairs
calls for nothing short of rejoicing. At no time in Russian history has the
individual enjoyed greater freedom of expression. Never before have so
many Russians enjoyed access to so much uncensored information. Close to
three quarters of the urban population enjoy broadband Internet access; 95
percent of Russia's youth (defined as 12- to 34-year-olds) connect in some
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8808689/Vladimir-Putin-diving-
discovery-was-staged-spokesman-admits.html (reporting admission of Kremlin Press
Spokesman Dmitrii Peskov, reversing previous press coverage suggesting otherwise).
1 In his latest televised call-in program, Putin answered 85 questions selected from
approximately three million requests. Jonathan Earle, In Marathon Show, Putin Pledges to
Stay the Course, Moscow TIMES (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/in-marathon-show-putin-pledges-to-stay-the-
course/479297.html. The manner of selection does not appear to be random. See, e.g., Ellen
Barry, For Nearly 5 Hours, a Showcase of Putin's Fully Intact Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/europe/for-nearly-5-hours-a-confident-
putin-takes-questions.html ("He pledged help for retirees and factory workers, and he
benevolently granted petitions, like one from a pigtailed girl in Russia's Far East who asked
for a playground. (He was still speaking when word came that the regional authorities had
already begun a construction project on his orders, and the audience applauded.)").
16 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, 228-29 (Emma Smith ed., 2002) (1623)
("KATHARINE: Is it possible dat I sould love de ennemi of France? KING: No, it is not
possible you should love the enemy of France, Kate. But, in loving me, you should love the
friend of France, for I love France so well that I will not part with a village of it. I will have it
all mine; and, Kate, when France is mine and I am yours, then yours is France and you are
mine. KATHARINE: I cannot tell vat is dat.").
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way to the Internet, either with computers or mobile phones.17 Compare
those statistics to a time, even very late in the Soviet era, when strict state
censorship was the norm, foreign radio broadcasts were deliberately
jammed, and most Soviet citizens lived under an information blackout most
of the time (whether concerning wafe and price adjustments or the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster).
Such a narrow historical perspective for comparison does not yield a
particularly helpful vantage point on Russia today. The statistics that opened
this essay reflect a Russia in turmoil. But it is not the same turmoil that
Russia has confronted in its past. Russian history, whether imperial or
Soviet, is one of harsh censorship and overt police repression of dissenting
voices. There is little point to a comparison of this sort; both the degree and
means of that past repression are incomparably too extreme to be useful
metrics to judge the present.19
What is more, the nature of dissent and the forms that free expression
took in response to such measures are not comparable to the dissent and
disquiet in today's Russia. The 1990s saw a free-for-all explosion of media
outlets, newspapers, and other sources of information just as the Russian
economy experienced an unprecedented free fall that left millions destitute
and in a state of shock.20 With this opening up of Russian society alongside
market collapse, some decried the loss of cultural literacy (though seemingly
n FREEDOM ON THE NET, supra note 8, at 2-3.
18 THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 477-87
(Archie Brown et al. eds., 1994); ARCHIE BROWN, THE RISE AND FALL OF COMMUNISM 473-75
(2009).
19 See P.S. SQUIRE, THE THIRD DEPARTMENT: THE POLITICAL POLICE IN THE RUSSIA OF
NICHOLAS 1 (1968); Roy A. MEDVEDEV, LET HISTORY JUDGE: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF STALINISM (Colleen Taylor trans., David Joravsky & Georges Haupt eds.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1971) (1969); ALEKSANDR I SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO
(Thomas P. Whitney trans., Harper & Row 1974) (1973).
20 See Gregory Walker, Book Publishing, in THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIA
AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, supra note 18, at 478 ("In 1991 about 1,800 non-state
publishing-houses were registered in Russia, in contrast to the 235 publishers functioning in
the entire USSR in 1988."); Martin Dewhurst, Censorship, in THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, supra note 18, at 487 (observing that in 1992,
"There was, however, practically no pre-publication censorship, and the problems faced by
writers, scholars, scientists, journalists, and cinema directors, were mainly economic,
resulting from enormous shortages of, and the virtual monopoly control over and high prices
charged for, paper supplies, printing and distribution facilities and film stock. Ironically, this
meant that for the general public the availability and range of high-quality Russian literature,
journalism and films were no greater than they had been during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev
periods, and less than under Gorbachev.").
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forgetting how the state had tightly controlled entry into the official cultural
canon in Soviet times). To some, the collapse of Soviet controls meant a
race-to-the-bottom of Western-style commercialism imbedded in a
mushrooming mass media.21 Others noted oddities of a different sort. As
one of the preeminent scholars of the Soviet Union and communism has
observed, "Paradoxical though it may appear, some of the freest and
broadest-ranging conversations in the world took place round the kitchen
tables in the apartments of the intelligentsia in Moscow and Leningrad
during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years of oppressive Communist rule in
Russia."22 The fruits of freedom of expression, like the avenues for its
suppression, are thus not so easily measured.
If a comparison with Russian history is inadequate on its own, perhaps a
comparison with the recent history of Russia's Eastern and Central European
neighbors is worthwhile. Do Russians have more or less freedom of
expression than citizens in countries newly independent from Soviet control?
One of the most important events of the twentieth century was the collapse
of the Soviet Union and a new release from the "prison of nations" that was
both catalyst and consequence of that collapse. Beginning in 1989, the
Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe broke free from four decades of
Soviet control. To the immediate west, north, and south, 14 of the 15 Soviet
socialist republics that made up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
declared their independence, while within the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic (the fifteenth component of the USSR), 26 other entities
24declared their sovereignty from Moscow in a bid for more autonomy. All
this occurred in a span of less than three years. Imagine if the fifty states of
the United States splintered apart to form separate countries in less than the
time it takes to cam a law degree.
This year, we celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of
a new, democratic Russian Federation following the adoption by referendum
of a new, democratic constitution in 1993.25 Perhaps the proper starting
21 See, e.g., ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, CHANGING CHANNELS: TELEVISION AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR POWER IN RUSSIA 235-36 (1997).
22 BROWN, supra note 18, at 258.
23 Students of Russian and Soviet history will recognize the quoted expression as the
promise of Vladimir Lenin. V.I. LENIN, On the Question of National Policy (April 6 (19),
1914), in COLLECTED WORKS 217, 219 (Julius Katzer ed., Bernard Isaacs & Joe Fineberg
trans., 1964), available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/apr/06b.htm.
24 Jeff Kahn, The Parade of Sovereignties: Establishing the Vocabulary of the New
Russian Federalism, 16 POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 58 (2000).
25 It should be noted that the validity of this referendum was contested. See STEPHEN
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point for evaluation is to compare Russia's trajectory of transition to other
democratic transitions.
Russia clearly lags behind most of the states of Central and Eastern
Europe that escaped Soviet controls to form their own democratic societies
(Belarus, the last unabashed dictatorship in Europe, being the glaring
exception).26 By most reputable measures, the citizens of these other
countries enjoy far more freedom of expression and unhindered access to
information. But as scholars have noted, the trajectories of these countries
may say less about easily discoverable patterns, rules, and norms of
transitions to democracy than they do about the particular experiences of
these various countries (or groups of countries) themselves.28 For example,
"[n]one of the former Warsaw Pact countries of East Central Europe (unlike
the former USSR) experienced widespread bloodshed over 'stateness'
problems. Also, unlike Russia, there is no ambivalent legacy about the loss
of an empire or the disintegration of the USSR." 29 While the comparative
project of the political science subdiscipline known during its short and
optimistic life span as "transitology" did indeed produce valuable insights
about roughly similarly situated countries, equally important were the
distinguishing factors that transitologists uncovered:
WHITE ET AL., How RUSSIA VOTES 99-101 (1997).
26 For the period December 2011 to November 2012, Reporters without Borders ranked
Belarus 157 out of 179 countries in terms of press freedom, with no European country ranked
lower on the list. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 4. Freedom House identified
Belarus as fifth among "the 10 most serious violators of press freedom in the world." Arch
Puddington, The 10 Worst Countries for Journalists, FOREIGN POLICY (May 1, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/01/the_10_worst places to be ajournalist.
27 Compare Russia's ranking (148) in the Reporters without Borders 2013 World Press
Freedom Index with the rankings for Estonia (11), Czech Republic (16), Poland (22),
Slovakia (23), Lithuania (33), Slovenia (35), Latvia (39), and Romania (42) just to consider
the top fifty. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 4. The United States, by
comparison, is ranked 32. Id. Or compare Russia's ranking (176 - "not free") in the Freedom
House Freedom of the Press 2013 rankings with Estonia (13 - "free"), Czech Republic (27 -
"free"), Slovakia (35 - "free"), Lithuania and Slovenia (tied at 40 - "free"), and Poland (47 -
"free"). FREEDOM HOUSE, GLOBAL PRESS FREEDOM RANKINGS 2013 (2013), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Global%20and%20Regional%20Rankings.pd
f. The United States is ranked 23. Id.
28 For an early, outstanding effort to conceptualize the post-Communist transitions in
Central and Eastern Europe in comparative perspective, see JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN,
PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH
AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (1996).
29 Id. at 445.
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Other important explanatory factors for democratization differences
in post-Communist Europe for future researchers to explore are, of
course, those related to time, prior regime types, and the presence or
absence of a usable democratic legacy. The USSR lasted for about
seventy-five years, during much of which totalitarian practices
predominated. East Central Europe was a part of the Soviet
subsystem for only forty years. In Poland for much of this period,
authoritarian, not totalitarian, political realities predominated. In
Hungary, mature post-totalitarianism evolved. Finally, pre-
Communist history must be analyzed comparatively.
Czechoslovakia, for example, was democratic from independence in
1919 until the Nazi interventions of 1938. There is virtually no such
usable pre-Communist democratic past in the non-Baltic countries of
the former Soviet Union. This does not mean that democracy is
impossible in these countries; it does mean, however, that there will
be longer and more perilous journeys toward constitutionalism and
state reconstruction before democracy becomes, if ever, the only
game in town.30
The Russian case makes abundantly clear that not every transition from
authoritarianism is inevitably a transition to democracy or norms of free
expression associated with modem-day democratic republics.
But why should that be surprising? Was it so easy to predict twenty
years after the founding of the United States that our own constitutional
democracy would develop such robust protections for freedom of
expression?
Fearful of the revolutionary fervor and reign of terror unleashed in
France, the political life of the new American republic was awash in anxiety
about enemies, foreign and domestic. Not ten years after the signing of the
US Constitution, the First Congress adopted some of the most repressive
legislation the country has ever known. Foreigners (whether from country
friend or foe) whom the President deemed dan erous could be detained
without charge or trial and summarily deported. Immediately after the
experience of repressive English laws aimed at stifling a free press, the First
Congress (stuffed with drafters, signers, and ratifiers of the Constitution)
'o Id. at 45 1-52.
3' Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1
Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24). See also GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUs TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 31 (2004).
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passed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.32 These laws reinstated the
crime of seditious libel as a cudgel quite willingly used by office holders
against their opponents. Fines or imprisonment awaited anyone convicted of
having written, uttered, or published anything "false, scandalous and
malicious" with the intent to defame or bring into contempt or disrepute the
President, government, or either house of Congress.33 The Sedition Act in
particular, which Geoffrey Stone described as "perhaps the most grievous
assault on free speech in the history of the United States," occurred less than
a dozen years after the signing of the Constitution. 34 Living by the First
Amendment was not easy, even for those who wrote it.35
As a lawyer and a political scientist, rather than as a historian or policy
analyst, I prefer a more straightforward approach to assessing the freedom of
expression in Russia and prospects for its future. What has the Russian state
promised its citizens, in what legal forms have those promises been made,
and how well are those paper promises being kept in practice? This
approach has an advantage that I think the other approaches lack: it better
identifies the reasons the Russian state has become ever more repressive
after its first chaotic decade of democracy and the rise of Vladimir Putin in
its second decade. My argument here today is that Russian repression of
free expression is symptomatic of a larger, structural problem. That problem
is that Russia lacks political and judicial institutions with the autonomy,
strength, and authority to defend (or at least fight over) the pie-crust
promises that are made in its Constitution.36 In other words, the weakness of
freedom of expression in Russia is a separation of powers problem.
Like most constitutions these days, whether ratified by liberal
democracies or announced by petty dictators, Russia's Constitution has a
wonderful set of promises about freedom of expression. Everyone, Article
29 states, shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and speech. Of course,
32 Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802); 1 Stat. at 570; 1 Stat. at 577;
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
3 1 Stat. at 596, § 2
34 STONE, supra note 31, at 19.
3 One might just as easily consider Revolutionary France. It did not take long for the
Reign of Terror to sweep away the liberty of revolutionary France, or for the Thermidor coup
that followed. In fact, fear of Jacobin-inspired rebellion was an inspiration for the Alien and
Sedition Acts in the United States. Id. at 21, 33-36.
36 See CHRISTINA ROSSETTI, Promises Like Piecrust, in POEMS AND PROSE 125 (Simon
Humphries ed., 2008). See also MARY POPPINS (Walt Disney Pictures 1964) (Mary Poppins:
"That's a piecrust promise. Easily made, easily broken.").
"l. Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and speech. 2. Propaganda or
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in the very next sentence, the restrictions begin: "Propaganda or agitation,
which arouses social, racial, national or religious hatred and hostility shall be
prohibited. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic
supremacy shall also be prohibited."
None of these words are defined in the Constitution, of course, but the
result has been an expansive view by state executive authorities of the
restrictions on expression and a cramped view of the freedom itself (views
that, not incidentally, have not been robustly challenged by a judiciary
whose independence has often been subject to question, as noted below).
This we can detect from recent statutes enacted to regulate speech,
association, and other forms of expression. Consider in reverse
chronological order a few of the most recent statutes that have been passed.
The first Russian law to consider was actually passed in retaliation for
an American law. On December 14, 2012, President Obama signed into law
the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule
of Law Accountability Act of 2012.38 This US statute brought an end to
trade restrictions adopted under the so-called Jackson-Vanik Amendment to
the Trade Act of 1974.39 As its double-barrel name implies, the Act
normalized trade relations while responding to widespread anger at the death
of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. Magnitsky, a young lawyer for the
private equity firm Hermitage Capital, was detained for a year after alleging
corruption in the tax ministry. He died under highly suspicious
circumstances while in Russian police custody in 2009.40 The Magnitsky
agitation, which arouses social, racial, national or religious hatred and hostility shall be
prohibited. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy shall also
be prohibited. 3. Nobody shall be forced to express his thoughts and convictions or to deny
them. 4. Everyone shall have the right freely to seek, receive, transmit, produce and
disseminate information by any legal means. The list of types of information, which
constitute State secrets, shall be determined by federal law. 5. The freedom of the mass
media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited." KoNST. RF art. 29.
38 Magnitsky Act, Pub. L. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496 (2012).
39 19 U.S.C. §§ 2431-34 (2012). These restrictions, long a source of irritation in U.S.-
Russian relations, were originally passed in response to harsh Soviet restrictions on (primarily
Jewish) emigration.
40 Congress cited as authoritative the findings of Russian President Dimitry Medvedev's
Human Rights Council, issued on July 6, 2011:
"The Human Rights Council concluded that Sergei Magnitsky's arrest and
detention was illegal; he was denied access to justice by the courts and
prosecutors of the Russian Federation; he was investigated by the same law
enforcement officers whom he had accused of stealing Hermitage Fund
companies and illegally obtaining a fraudulent $230,000,000 tax refund; he was
11IFreedom ofExpression in Post-Soviet Russia
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Act obliges the President to submit to Congress a list of individuals involved
with that case or involved with similar cases who are to be deemed
inadmissible to the United States and whose assets in the United States are to
be frozen.41
Two weeks later, President Putin signed the Dima Yakovlev Act, known
42informally as the Anti-Magnitsky Act. The portion of this law that
garnered the most attention in the United States prohibits Americans from
adopting Russian children.43 Another provision mandates creation of a
Russian list of US citizens who are prohibited from entering, owning
property, or conducting business in Russia because they are "guilty of
violating the fundamental human rights and freedoms of Russian citizens."4
A pro-Kremlin Russian news outlet described the list as one intended to
respond to "cases in which US officials either failed to react or reacted
inadequately to incidences of adopted Russian children experiencing
abuse-and even death-by their new US families." 45 An American reader
may find this provision a peculiarly misdirected form of retaliation against
denied necessary medical care in custody; he was beaten by 8 guards with
rubber batons on the last day of his life; and the ambulance crew that was called
to treat him as he was dying was deliberately kept outside of his cell for one
hour and 18 minutes until he was dead. The report of the Human Rights Council
also states the officials falsified their accounts of what happened to Sergei
Magnitsky and, 18 months after his death, no officials had been brought to trial
for his false arrest or the crime he uncovered. The impunity continued in April
2012, when Russian authorities dropped criminal charges against Larisa
Litvinova, the head doctor at the prison where Magnitsky died."
Magnitsky Act § 402(8).
41 Id. §§ 404-06.
42 (DeepajibHLIiA 3aKOH OT 28 AeKa6psi 2012 r. N 272-03, <<O mepaX Bo3JieiCTBHA Ha JHII,
npHMacTHbX K HapymeaHiM ocHoBoTOJITaraIotIHx npas a cBO609 qeJOBeKa, npaB H cBo6o
rpaKgan PoccuicKoil Genepauni>> [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Measures
Against Persons, Involved in Violations of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Rights and
Freedoms of Citizens of the Russian Federation], Ros. GAZ., Dec. 29, 2012, p. I [hereinafter
Federal Law No. 272-FZ], available at http://www.rg.ru/2012/12/29/zakon-dok.html.
President Putin signed the bill into law on December 28, 2012; it entered into force on
January 1, 2013.
41 Id. art. 4.
4 Id. arts. 1-2; A Law on Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights
and Freedoms of Russian Citizens has Been Signed, WEBSITE OF THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA
(Dec. 28, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/4810.
45 Robert Bridge, Moscow Responds to US Magnitsky Act with Dima Yakovlev Law,
RT.com (RUSSIATODAY) (Dec. 12, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://rt.com/politics/russia-us-yakovlev-
magnitsky-human-rights-898/.
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the United States for a list of those complicit in Magnitsky's death or similar
human rights abuses by the state. But the American reader is also likely to
be unfamiliar with the expansive coverage in the largely state-controlled
Russian media of American cases of child abuse and neglect concerning
Russian orphans. According to a survey conducted shortly after the
Russian provision entered into force, over half of Russians polled supported
the measure.47 The focus on such stories, tragedies to be sure, is a telling
example of state controls on the Russian mass media and their resulting
ability to shape the public debate. Sergei Magnitsky's story was not pursued
nearly as aggressively by the state-controlled media.
The dueling nature of these statutes is only the beginning, and the
adoption restrictions and list of individuals deemed personae non gratae in
Russia are really the lesser story. Even if some might dismiss the lists
created by the Magnitsky and Anti-Magnitsky acts as tit-for-tat politics
(wrongly implying what many would consider to be a false equivalence of
principle between the two statutes), Article 3 of the Russian statute goes
much further, applying a guilt-by-association sanction to Russian citizens,
too. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that engage in undefined
"political activity" in Russia and that receive funds from American citizens
or organizations (regardless of their listing under the prior articles) may have
their activity suspended if the state determines that their activities "present a
threat to the interests of the Russian Federation.',48 In addition to suspension
(which appears to be accomplished solely by a decree of the executive), the
property of the NGO may then be seized pursuant to a court order.49 By late
January 2013, the Russian Foreign Ministry had also compiled a list of at
least 71 Americans who would be denied entry into Russia. 50  A law
professing to protect fundamental rights does so by restricting freedom of
expression and association.
46 Dima Yakovlev, for whom the Russian law was named, died of heat stroke in 2008; his
American adoptive father was acquitted at trial for involuntary manslaughter. Will Englund,
Russians Say They'll Name Their Magnitsky-Retaliation Law After Baby Who Died in a Hot
Car in Va., WASH. PosT (Dec. 11, 2012, 9:10 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/12/ 1/magnitsky-retaliation-
man-baby/.
47 Press Release, Russian Public Opinion Research Center, Dima Yakovlev Bill: Public
Assessment (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.wciom.com/index.phpid=61 &uid=756.
48 Federal Law No. 272-FZ, supra note 42, art. 3, § 1.
49 Id. art. 3, § 3.
50 The Lavrov List Expanded From 11 to 71 Names of Americans, ITAR-TASS (Jan. 21,
2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c 142/626443.html.
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The Anti-Magnitsky Act was not the first statute to restrict the activities
of non-governmental organizations. In July 2012, just months after
returning to the presidency, Vladimir Putin signed a law requiring politically
active groups that accept foreign money to declare themselves to be "foreign
agents. 5 There is a host of restrictions on what those NGOs can do once
they are so labeled, but the very label "foreign agent" has a connotation in
Russian history and Russian society which makes it that much harder for
these NGOs even to function. The law appears to be working its intended
effect. Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the octogenarian doyenne of the Russian
human rights community and leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group,
announced that her long-established human rights NGO would forego
foreign grants, saying, "I don't want to be a foreign agent." 52
There are many more statutes besides these two. A week before this
symposium, in early February 2013, the Kremlin announced stricter
reporting requirements for NGOs receiving state funding, including the
possible creation of a blacklist for NGOs that submit unsatisfactory reports
of their work.53 This announcement is all the more ominous because Russia
ordered the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to
stop funding Russian organizations in September 2012.54 There is an anti-
rally law (signed June 8, 2012). On January 7, 2013, this so-called "Hyde
Park" law entered into force, under which "special assigned venues" are
preselected for public protest (an effort to avoid the colossal protests that
marched too close to the Kremlin in December 2011)." Amendments to the
law on freedom of conscience proposed by the Ministry of Justice would
5 DegtepalbHbIl 3aKOH OT 20 mioiA 2012 r. N 121-03 <0 BHeceHHH H3MCHCHHA B
oTrtenhHhlT 38KOHO8TCJibHhle aKTlb PoccHiCKOfi cIegepaUHIn a vacT perynHpoBaHiis
AeSTe~JbHOCTH HeKOMMepeCKHX OpraHl3811auiH, BbIOJIHHIIO1tiHX tlyHKIiii HHOCTpaHHOTO
areHTa [Federal Law Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation with
Regard to the Regulation of Non-Profit Organizations Acting as a Foreign Agent], Ros. GAZ.,
July 23, 2013, p. 6, available at http://www.rg.ru/2012/07/23/nko-dok.html.
52 Alexander Bratersky, Q & A: Alexeyeva Lives Golden Years and the Golden Rule,
Moscow TIMES (July 20, 2012), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/qa-
alexeyeva-lives-golden-years-and-the-golden-rule/462346.html.
s3 Terp Ko3non, KpeMilb CO3aem vepfbie cnUCKu HKO [Kremlin Creates an NGO
Blacklist], IZVESTIA (Feb. 8, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://izvestia.ru/news/544570 (Russ.).
S4 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, On Russian Decision to End USAID Activities in
Russia (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197846.htm.
5s Moscow will Form its Hyde Parks, ITAR-TASS (Jan. 9, 2013, 10:53 AM),
http://www.itar-tass.com/cl42/616764.html. In Moscow, these venues will be located in
Gorky Park and Sokolniki Park, farther from the Kremlin than Bolotnaya Square, where the
December 2012 rallies centered. Id.
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limit "unauthorized outdoor religious activity."56 Slander has been
recriminalized. The definition of treason has been expanded to include
more acts more vaguely stated than before, and narrowed to require less
proof of harm to the security of the Russian state. 8
Many if not most of these laws and state actions are possible because of
the very weak separation of powers in the Russian Federation. The formal
56 Religious Actions to be Given the Same Status as Rallies, ITAR-TASS (Jan. 18, 2013,
1:00 PM), http://www.itar-tass.com/en/cl42/624722.html.
57 Slander (art. 129) and Insult (art. 130) were decriminalized in December 2011 under
President Medvedev. See Article 1(45) in cIeAepaJnbHIll 3aKOH Poccuticxoti tDenepaui OT 7
AeKa6ps 2011 r. N 420-03 <<O BHeceHHH H3MeHeHrI B YronOBHbLi KOaCKC POCCH&ICKOfi
cIen1epauHH 1 oTejIsabie 3aKOHoaaTejibHie aKTbl POCCHICKoi GDegepauni>> [Federal Law
Amending the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation], Ros. GAZ., Dec. 09, 2011, p. 13, available at
http://www.rg.ru/2011/12/08/p-raboty-site-dok.html. Slander was returned to the Criminal
Code under a new Article 128.1 by President Putin roughly eight months later. cDenepaJIbHblIk
3aKOH OT 28 mionis 2012 r. N 141-03 <<O BHeceHHH H3MeHeHHIi B YroJIOBHLII KojeKC
PoccHAicKOff GDeepauHu m oTellbHbie 38KOHOiaTeJ~bHbie aKTMi POCCHfCKoii Oegepaunuw>
[Federal Law Amending the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Certain Legislative
Acts of the Russian Federation], Ros. GAZ., Aug. 1, 2012, p. 18, available at
http://www.rg.ru/2012/08/01/kleveta-dok.html.
5 GDeaepajmi1it 3aKOH POCCHilCKOl Oejepalmln OT 12 Hos6psl 2012 r. N 190-03 <<O
BHeceaHnn u3seMHCH4ff B YFOJIOBHbll KoAeKC POCCHIRCKOi cleepauam H B cTaTb)o 151
YrOJIOBHo-rnpoueccyanHorO Konexca PoccnicKOi cGegepauiH>> [Federal Law Amending the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Article 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
the Russian Federation], Ros. GAZ., Nov. 14, 2012, p. 18 [hereinafter Federal Law No. 190-
FZ], available at http://www.rg.ru/2012/11/14/izmenenia-dok.html. In its previous version,
Article 275 of the Criminal Code defined the crime of state treason as "espionage, the
delivery of a state secret or other assistance to a foreign state, foreign organization, or their
representatives in carrying out hostile acts to damage the foreign security of the Russian
Federation." qGentepanHbl1 38KOH POCCHriCKOff Gegepauni OT 27 AeKa6ps 2009 r. N 377-03
<0 BHeceHHH H3MeHeHHRI B OTACJIbHble 38KOHOAaTJrbHble rKThl PoccHiCKoii Oenepaun B
cBAS3H c BBeeHHM B geniCTBHe noJnoKeHHH YrOJIOBHOFO KoteKca PocedlicKori DeDepauini H
YrOJIOBHO-HCnOIHHTeJibHOrO KoAeKca Poccnficxofi cIeepauHH O HaKa3aHIIH B BHAe
orpaHHeCHMH cBo6otbl>> [Federal Law Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation in Connection with the Enactment of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
and the Penal Code of the Russian Federation for the Punishment of Restriction of Freedom],
Ros. GAZ., Dec. 30, 2009, p. 11, available at http://www.rg.ru/2009/12/30/arest-dok.html. In
addition to the revelation of state secrets, the new law expands treason to include the
rendering of "financial, material-technical, consultative, or other assistance to a foreign state,
international or foreign organization or their representatives in activity directed against the
security of the Russian Federation." The limiting element in the previous version of the law
that required damage to "the foreign security" ("yluep6 BHemIHefi 6e3OnaCHOCTH") of Russia
has been narrowed by the deletion of the qualifier to acts "that are directed against the
security" of the state.
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structures of separate institutions exist-a bicameral federal legislature,
independently constituted courts, an elected executive, a structure of federal-
regional divisions-but these structures disguise an extraordinary practical
dominance by the presidential administration. This is my theoretical point.
Consider first the absence of horizontal separation of powers, the
principle by which power is controlled through checks and balances between
different branches of the federal government. The legislature has been
captured by the President's party, United Russia, and has been so for some
time. The government is led by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, at least
for now, but his hands are in fact tightly held by President Putin. This is the
so-called "tandem" around which Russian politics has revolved for the last
five years. Vladimir Putin served as president from 2000 to 2008. Dmitri
Medvedev then became president from 2008 to 2012 while Putin switched to
service as Prime Minister. This arrangement was understood as a clear
decision to formally comply with a constitutional prohibition on consecutive
third terms while allowing Putin to retain considerable power. 59 Now, Putin
has returned as president and he is constitutionally permitted to remain in
office for two more consecutive terms. Barring the emergence of a strong
opposition candidate or some other unforeseen political development, he
may therefore rule until 2024. All of the laws diminishing the freedom of
expression that I identified above were passed by President Putin in the first
year of his return to the presidency in May 2012. In fact, slander was
recriminalized just months after then-President Medvedev signed its
decriminalization into law. The power of the president seems
unconstrained by the constitutional separation of powers because the
political reality is that legislative and executive powers are very weakly
separated, if at all.
Now consider the vertical separation of powers: federalism.61 There are
5 See KoNsT. RF art. 81, § 3. In December 2007, months before the March 2008
presidential elections, then First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev announced the
planned tandem: "In order to stay on this path, it is not enough to elect a new president who
shares this ideology. It is not less important to maintain the efficiency of the team formed by
the incumbent president. That is why I find it extremely important for our country to keep
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin at the most important position in the executive power, at the
post of the chairman of the government." Speech by Dmitri A. Medvedev, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
I1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/1 1/world/europe/medvedev-speech.html.
60 Federal Law No. 190-FZ, supra note 58.
61 See generally Jeffrey Kahn, Alexei Trochev, and Nikolay Balayan, The Unification of
Law in the Russian Federation, 25 PosT-SOVIET AFF. 310 (2009) (examining Russian
federalism from its decentralized beginnings under Yeltsin to the current centralized system
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83 constituent units of the Russian Federation. Seventy-seven of their
governors or presidents (the functional equivalent in regions demarcated as
ethnic republics within the Russian Federation) are members of the United
Russia ruling party.62 The vast majority of these governors are not elected,
direct elections having been cancelled by Putin in 2004 following the
63terrorist attacks on Beslan. And although gubernatorial elections have
been suggested and a few have even been held, a new wave of restrictive
bills threatens whatever weak federalism may be permitted.64 The vertical
separation of powers, like the horizontal variety, has been virtually
dismantled.
Let me turn then to the third branch of government-the courts. Kim
Lane Scheppele at Princeton described Russia at one point as being in the
grips of what Ernst Fraenkel called the "dual state."65 She was referring to
the division in Nazi Germany that Fraenkel described between ordinary
cases and political cases.66 Something similar exists in Russia. For ordinary
cases-ordinary commercial disputes or ordinary property disputes-the
under Medvedev and Putin).
62 Jonathan Earle, Bill to Limit Gubernatorial Elections Approved, Moscow TIMES (Jan.
23, 2013) http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/article/bill-to-limit-gubernatorial-elections-
approved/474464.html.
63 Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
511, 530-31 (2008).
6 On July 1, 2012, gubernatorial elections were restored after an eight-year hiatus.
Bierop Xampaes et al., Fy6epuamopau comoesm cmetuannyio cucmeAiy iieaumusinocmu:
PeouoHaabHblx napsasteumapues saunmepecoeamnu R6eo u36upameqei [Combined
Legitimacy: Federation Subjects are to be Granted the Power to Abolish Gubernatorial
Elections], KOMMERSANT (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2109399. On
October 5, 2012, five subjects of RF elected governors under the new law. Id. On January
16, 2013, the Duma held its first reading ofa draft law delegating choice to subjects. Id The
draft law would permit a regional legislature to elect a governor after candidates are proposed
by political parties in the RF Duma or regional legislature, from whom a slate of three
nominees would be selected by RF President for the election. Direct Gubernatorial Elections
Should be Everywhere or Nowhere - Experts, ITAR-TASS (Jan. 25, 2013), http://en.itar-
tass.com/russia/688834.. But on January 23, 2013, a United Russia bill in the Duma was put
forward to exclude "multi-ethnic" regions from direct gubernatorial elections. Richard
Arnold, Russian Duma Backtracks on Direct Regional Elections, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?txttnews%5Bttnews%5D=40442.
65 1 first heard Professor Scheppele make this comparison at an AALS National
Conference "Hot Topics" Panel that I organized. Kim Lane Scheppele, The Dictatorship of
Law: The Khodorkovsky Case, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law in Russia, Panel
Presentation at the Association of American Law Schools National Conference (Jan. 6, 2012).
66 See ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE (E.A. Shils et al trans., 1941).
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courts are not only functional, but at some levels functioning quite well and
professionally. But if a political case should arise, a different world
emerges. This is the world of the former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, or
the opposition blogger Alexey Navalny, or the members of the punk rock
group Pussy Riot.
I was asked to speak specifically about Pussy Riot today, although for
reasons that should become clear, I would prefer to concentrate on the
Khodorkovsky case. For those who are unfamiliar, Pussy Riot is a
sensationalist punk rock group that, on February 21, 2012, performed what
they called a punk prayer-a loud, crass, and disrespectful anti-Putin
demonstration-on the altar of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, a newly-
rebuilt church not far from the Kremlin.67 They were charged with
hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.68 The charge of hooliganism, at
least, probably is not all that dissimilar to a disorderly conduct charge in the
United States. Had they performed something similar in the National
Cathedral in Washington, I would not be surprised if they were charged in
that way. The Pussy Riot women were sentenced to a two-year term of
incarceration; disorderly conduct in the United States would probably result,
at most, in ninety days in jail and a small fine.69  But aside from the
disproportionate sentence, the case actually has surprisingly little to teach
about Russia's approach to freedom of expression.
At first glance, the Khodorkovsky case does not seem to have anything
67 The performance occurred on February 21, 2012. )Jeno #1-170/12, Hlpurosop [Case
No. 1-170/2012, Verdict] (Aug. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Case No. 1-170/12],
http://hamovnichesky.msk.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=suddelo&srv-num= I &name-op=do
c&number-l 17671859&delo id=1540006&new-&text number-1. Three members of the
group--Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Maria Alyokhina, and Yekaterina Samutsevich-were
arrested in early March 2012 for "hooliganism motivated by religious hatred." Id. On August
17, 2012, all three were convicted and sentenced to two years in labor
camps. Id Samutsevich was freed on appeal in October, sentence suspended and on
probation. One Pussy Riot Member Freed on Appeal, Two Stay Jailed, RIA NovosI (Oct.
10, 2012), http://en.ria.ru/crime/20121010/176530904.html. Two other members of the band
fled Russia out of fear of prosecution. Police Yet to Learn the Identities of Pussy Riot
Accomplices, RAPSI (Sept. 5, 2012), http://rapsinews.com/news/20120905/264584697.htm.
68 Case No. 1-170/12, supra note 67.
69 See D.C. CODE § 22-1321 (2011), under which a person who engages in "loud,
threatening, or abusive language, or disruptive conduct, with the intent and effect of impeding
or disrupting the orderly conduct of a lawful public gathering, or of a congregation of people
engaged in any religious service or in worship, a funeral, or similar proceeding" may be found
guilty of a misdemeanor and fined up to $500, imprisoned for up to ninety days, or both.
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to do with freedom of expression. 70 Russia's richest oil baron found himself
in a political conflict with Vladimir Putin. In October 2003, he was arrested
and has remained in confinement ever since. In April 2004, the Russian Tax
Ministry ordered his Yukos Oil Company to pay C2.8 billion in tax arrears,
interest, and penalties, giving him one day to execute payment. However, by
a decision of a Moscow commercial court rendered on the same day that the
demand was served, Yukos was enjoined from disposing of certain assets in
anticipation of a judgment by the court, a judgment that ultimately led to the
bankruptcy and forced sale of Yukos to state-owned Rosneft. In May 2005,
Khodorkovsky was sentenced to nine years in prison after being convicted,
inter alia, of fraud and tax evasion. Just as he became eligible for parole, he
was tried again and, in December 2010, convicted of embezzlement and
money laundering and sentenced to 14 years in prison.71 Khodorkovsky's
fate has long served as a warning to others.72
The Khodorkovsky case was investigated by the Kremlin's Human
Rights Council. One might be surprised to discover that the Kremlin even
has a Human Rights Council.73 But what happened in the aftermath of its
state-sanctioned investigation further illustrates the separation of powers
problem that I raised earlier. This Council has no power other than to
investigate and report. It spent a year studying the case to determine what, if
anything, went wrong as a matter of law. The Council obtained the
70 The following general description draws from, and a more detailed description may be
obtained in, Jeffrey Kahn, Report on the Verdict Against MB. Khodorkovsky and P.L.
Lebedev, 4 J. EURASIAN L. 321 (2011).
71 Alexey Navalny, an opposition blogger in Russia, has recently come under threat from
similar charges of embezzlement. The same articles of the criminal code that were used to
charge Khodorkovsky and put him under threat of imprisonment are now used against
Navalny. Jonathan Earle, Opposition Figures' Legal Woes Mount, Moscow TIMES (Jan. 21,
2013), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/opposition-figures-legal-woes-
mount/474224.html.
72 Paul Goble, Window on Eurasia: Leading NGOs, Running out of Funds, May be Forced
to Close, WINDOW ON EURASIA - NEW SERIES (Jan. 19, 2013, 8:30 AM),
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/01/window-on-eurasia-russias-leading-
ngos.html, republished by JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://russialist.org/russias-leading-ngos-running-out-of-funds-may-be-forced-to-close/
("[Memorial Council Chairman Oleg] Orlov suggested that some wealthy Russians may want
to support these programs that do so much good for ordinary Russians, 'but they have been
shown with the Khodorkovsky case what can happen to them if they begin to give money for
projects that do not have the approval of the authorities."').
7 See COBET flPH HlPE3HJjEHTE POCCHfICKOfI cDEJIEPAUHH HO PA3BHTHIO FPA)K4LAHCKOrO
OBllECTBA H flPABAM IEJIOBEKA [PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL
SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS], http://president-sovet.ru/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
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assistance of nine experts: six Russian scholars, two Europeans, and one
American. I was the American. We worked independently. I did not know
who were the other experts selected by the Council, and I was not paid for
my work. All of these measures, I now realize in retrospect, were designed
to protect the autonomy and integrity of the investigative process.74
As it turns out, there were good reasons for the Council to exercise such
caution. The Council submitted our work to President Medvedev in
December 2011, coincidentally at the height of mass protests catalyzed by
allegations of fraud in recent parliamentary election returns and the
announcement that the tandem of President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin was again going to exchange positions.75 The
report was subected to criticism by state officials and in state-controlled
media outlets. But worse was yet to come. The week before this
symposium, it was revealed that as many as four of the six Russian
experts-professors of law, economists, experts at still-surviving NGOs-
found themselves in the sights of Russian investigators. 77 These individuals
had been subjected to search warrants, their property seized, their homes
searched. They were brought before investigators and subjected to lengthy
questioning.
74 These ground rules were articulated in my first correspondence with the Council. See
infra Appendix 1, pp. 24-27, letter from Mikhail Fedotov and Tamara Morshchakova to
author (Apr. 2, 2011) ("The range of issues on which you may present your views would be
determined in accordance with your preferences. The expert analysis is to be conducted on a
voluntary basis and on the condition of confidentiality. The list of experts involved and the
content of their opinions shall be made public only after they have been submitted to the
Council. Your expert opinion will be treated as an independent part of the overall analysis.
As the expert, you will be free to determine the format of your opinion.").
75 See Explanatory Memorandum, Report on the Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments by the Russian Federation, EUR. PARL. Doc. 13018, f 56-66 (Sept. 14, 2012),
available at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XReflX2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=18998&lang=EN.
76 See, e.g., GegoToB o 3asBjeHHH CK PCI no 3KcnepTH3e gena IOKOCa: "y4Te
maTqacT," Interfax.ru (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.interfax.ru/news/238756 (in which a
representative of the RF Investigative Committee alleged that some of the participants in the
Human Rights Council's examination may have received Yukos funding in the past); see also
Kremlin Experts Deny Taking Yukos Money, RIA NoVASTI (Apr. 1, 2012, 10:44 PM),
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120401/172538752.html.
n These events were subsequently summarized. See Jeffrey Kahn, In Putin's Russia,
Shooting the Messenger, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/opinion/in-putins-russia-shooting-the-messenger.html;
see also Tom Balmforth, Critics ofKhodorkovsky Verdict in Kremlin Crosshairs, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/khodorkovsky-crime-
trial/24940316.html.
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Why? An answer came just a few days before this symposium, when I
received a letter from the Chairman of the Human Rights Council, Mikhail
Fedotov, apprising me, and warning me, of these events. A copy of the
letter and its translation appear in Appendix Two. The letter notes, as
confirmed by numerous news reports, that the warrants were issued under
the pretext of investigating whether Khodorkovsky had financed the
"deliberately false conclusions of specialists under the guise of independent
public expertise by paying those who organized their production as well as
the experts." 79 When I read it, I felt a chill run down the back of my spine, a
metaphor well known to lawyers and scholars who specialize in laws
protecting freedom of expression. I can only imagine how cold that chill
must feel for the courageous Russian experts who undertook this task of
examining a case. Although they did so with the approval of then-President
Medvedev, they now face investigation by an administration that has been
returned to President Putin.
Is there any hope that can be injected into this bleak depiction? Yes, if
just a little. There is another power capable of exerting influence on Russian
practices, although it exists outside of Russia. At the very moment of the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia sought membership in the Council of
Europe. Membership, however, required Russian accession to the European
Convention on Human Rights, the human rights treaty that is the hallmark of
that international organization. After some false starts, substantial reforms,
and promises for further reform, Russia signed and ratified the Convention
in 1998. Among the obligations Russia undertook was judicial review of
its actions by the European Court of Human Rights that sits in Strasbourg, a
court that would hear the admissible petitions of individual applicants (not
merely the protests of other state parties to the treaty), award damages, and
insist on compliance with treaty norms.
Among the many rights and freedoms it protects, the European
7 Letter from Mikhail Fedotov to author (Feb. 13, 2013) (infra Appendix II, pp. 27-30).
7 Id.; see also JIeoHng HHKHTHHCKHA, Tpembe deo IOKOCa, o <neqeHbKax>, [Third
Yukos Case, About "Cookies"], NOVAYA GAz. (Feb., 8, 2013),
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/56623.html; 3ccnepmoe CTIV npec7edytom 3a doKBa0
no emopomy deny "IOKOCa" [HRC Experts Harrassed for Report on Second "YUKOS"
Case], GRANI.ru, (Feb. 6, 2013), http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/yukos/m.211325.html.
so I have explored this process elsewhere. Jeffrey Kahn, Russia's "Dictatorship of Law"
and the European Court of Human Rights, 29 REV. OF CENTRAL & E. EUR. LAW 1 (2004);
Jeffrey Kahn, Russian Compliance with Articles Five & Six of the European Convention of
Human Rights as a Barometer of Legal Reform & Human Rights in Russia, 35 MICH. J. L.
REFORM 641 (2002).
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Convention on Human Rights protects freedom of expression, freedom of
thought, and freedom of assembly.81 Member states that would restrict any
of these rights may do so only in a manner prescribed by law and necessity
in a democratic society. 82 The Strasbourg Court has repeatedly reviewed
claims by Russians alleging violation of these and other provisions of the
Convention. In the vast majority of these cases, judgment is issued for the
applicant.83
The Court is far from perfect. Judgments take a tremendously long
time, in part because of a clogged docket that is the result of a steady influx
of Russian cases.84 Not only do judgments come late, the remedies for
rights violations are often pitiably small.85 When they do come, however,
these judgments are carefully reasoned, and always reference Russian
domestic legal sources. Thus, these cases present a roadmap for future
81 See European Convention, supra note 3, arts. 9-11.
82 See European Convention, supra note 3, art. 9, § 2, art. 10, § 2 & art. 11, § 2 (each
providing that restrictions on the exercise of these rights are limited by the requirement, inter
alia, that such restrictions "are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society").
83 Between 1959 and 2011, the Court has found Russia in violation of Article 10 in 23
judgments, the fourth highest number of such violations of all states-parties to the
Convention. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLATION BY ARTICLE AND BY
STATE, 1959-2011, at 2 (2011),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats-violation_1959_2011 ENG.pdf. To put this
number into perspective, as of January 1, 2011, the European Court had rendered 1,079
judgments in which Russia was a party. Of that number, 1,019 were judgments that Russia
had violated the Convention and 39 judgments found no violation of the Convention (21 other
judgments were also issued). See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTRY FACT
SHEETS, 1959-2010, at 46 (2011),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CountryFactsheets_1959 2010 ENG.pdf.
84 At the end of 2012, the European Court recorded 128,100 applications pending before a
judicial formation, 22.3 percent of which were submitted concerning the Russian Federation.
That is the highest percentage of any of the 47 member states (Turkey occupied a distant
second place, with 13.2 percent). See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF
STATISTICS 2012, at 6-8 (2013),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats analysis 2012 ENG.pdf.
85 Kahn, supra note 63, at 539-40.
86 Consider 000 Ivpress v. Russia, App. Nos. 33501/04, 38608/04, 35258/05, and
35618/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-116024, the most recent judgment
against Russia concerning freedom of expression, released on January 22, 2013. A regional
newspaper published articles critical of state officials, who sued the authors and the
newspaper for defamation. The Strasbourg Court carefully reviewed both the Russian
domestic law and the case law of the Convention before finding a violation of Article 10 of
the Convention in all of the defamation proceedings and awarding pecuniary damages and
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reform according to standards that Russia has already agreed to accept.
Surprisingly, the Russians always have paid the compensation and costs
ordered in these judgments, even if they have not always reformed their law
in response to the court's findings that they have violated the Convention
obligations. Still, the cases keep coming. Khodorkovsky has filed numerous
cases in his decade of confinement and won several of them. In February
2013, in the week just prior to this symposium, the lawyer for the
imprisoned members of the Pussy Riot group, Pavel Chikov, filed an
application with the Court that alleges violations of their rights to freedom of
speech and a fair trial, and alleges inhumane treatment in custody.8 7
Let me close with another quote from Shakespeare's Henry V. As the
play draws to a close, the victorious English king asks Katharine for a kiss.
Is it not the fashion, he asks her, for the maids of France to kiss before they
are married? He is disappointed to discover that Katharine does not really
want to kiss him. Henry replies, "0, Kate, nice customs curtsy to great
kings." Freedom of expression, like the separation of powers in a
democratic republic, needs a stronger foundation than the nice, but
occasional, custom found in post-Soviet Russia.
costs and expenses to the applicants.
87 Gabriela Baczynska, Russia's Pussy Riot appeal to European rights court, REUTERS
(Feb. 7, 2013, 5:07 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/07/uk-russia-pussyriot-
idUKBRE9160WP20130207.
ss SHAKESPEARE, supra note 16 at 231.
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